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abstract
In the course of the twentieth century, national governments have become 
increasingly subordinate to intergovernmental organizations such as IMF, eu 
or Wto. embodying a political culture based on compromise and bureaucra-
cy, the headquarters of these organizations rarely possess significant repre-
sentational qualities. however, one might also consider them as ‘machines 
for solving international conflicts’ (h. stierlin). such instrumental perspec-
tive sheds another light on these strongholds of globalization, highlighting 
their qualities on the operational plane. to this effect, this paper looks into 
the headquarters of a prominent example of such an organization, namely 
the nato. after london and Paris, nato moved to brussels in 1967. this 
relocation pattern not only reflects fluctuations in the international power 
balance but also reveals a permanent process of introspection within nato 
itself. the decision to transform the new facility – a temporary structure in 
attendance of a permanent building on a more prestigious location – into a 
standing headquarters in 1972 is a clear instance of this. Initially dubbed 
little siberia by reason of its remote location and austere aspect, internal 
memos from the nato archives show a growing appreciation for the pro-
visional site. the extreme rapidity of construction and moving was almost 
mythologized while the premises’ utilitarian aspect conveniently supported 
nato’s ‘no-frills’ self-image. Its non-hierarchical lay-out further seemed to 
suggest equality and harmonious collaboration whereas the self-contained 
nature of the building and its off-centre location reinforced the organization’s 
extra-territorial character. thus, as we will argue, apart from economical 
and pragmatic reasons, the decision to upgrade the provisional structure 
might also have derived from the growing insight that it not only embodied 
but also fostered values of crucial importance in facing the challenges of the 
cold War.
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installation in france
Founded in 1949, the north atlantic treaty organization (henceforth nato) 
is an intergovernmental military alliance whereby its member states agree 
to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party.1 It was 
the first unified multi-national command structure set up in peace-time. Its 
military headquarters (called shaPe: supreme headquarters allied Powers 
europe) were established in rocquencourt (near versailles), while its politi-
cal branch, the north atlantic council, held its regular Ministerial meetings 
in london. already at the lisbon summit in February 1952, nato engaged 
in the first of long series of reorganizations. to enhance its operational 
performance, the council was transformed into a body of Permanent rep-
resentatives (national delegations) and their supportive staff, presided by a 
secretary general.2 the inefficient geographical divide between the military 
and political branches was also addressed. Whereas london seemed the 
natural bridgehead between europe and america, Paris kept one trump 
card in reserve: it possessed ready-made office space at the Palais de 
trocadéro (opposite the eiffel tower), where vast (albeit temporary) office 
infrastructure had been built on the occasion of the sixth session of the uno 
in 1948.3 as a consolation prize, the very first secretary-general would be 
british (lord Ismay). although the arrival of yet another international organi-
zation confirmed Paris in its status of capital of the ‘free West’, there was 
much ado in the French press about maintaining a provisory structure on 
such a prominent location. Le Figaro even headlined ‘Il faut délivrer Paris 
de la lèpre de Chaillot!’ this dissent can retrospectively be considered as 
metaphorical for France’s mitigated feelings towards nato.
In april 1954, nato decided to construct a building of its own at the Porte 
dauphine on a plot of land donated by the French state. designed accord-
ing to an a-shaped plan (‘a’ for ‘alliance’ or ‘atomic’? as Libération joked) by 
an international team of architects headed by jacques carlu, the structure 
housed in fact two self-contained buildings: one housing the assembly rooms, 
a bank, a post-office, a newspaper shop and a fully equipped cinema, and 
another, highly secured one, with the council room, various committee rooms 
and approx. 1000 offices.4 this enormous amount of office space derived 
from the fact that all the national delegations were now united under one roof 
instead of being scattered all over Paris – an improvement that significantly 
accelerated and intensified the consultative process. Quite surprisingly, the 
monumental, glazed façade towards the Porte de dauphine (subsequently 
redesigned as a giant roundabout) had no ceremonial function; it only served 
as a backdrop for a series of flagpoles as the principal entrance to the building 
was located in the courtyard (between the two legs of the ‘a’-shape). this ill-
resolved tension between transparency, secrecy and communication with the 
public domain seems to have been the least of nato’s concerns, however. 
Indeed, apart from functional requirements, cost and speed of construction, 
the organization regarded the structure first and foremost as a practical in-
strument in the pursuit of its goals: ‘a utilitarian building has been produced 
(…), a manifestation of fifteen nations’ resolve to work in harmony on the task 
of defending their common heritage’.5 no wonder that appreciation for it was 
mitigated. the Times correspondent commented for example on its ‘unadven-
turous’ character both with regards to construction and design, and stated 
that it shared with many other French public buildings the characteristic of 
only being superficially modern. Moreover, compared to the recently opened 
unesco building, the fact that an organization of such symbolic importance 
as nato could not erect a more challenging and revolutionary building was 
felt as a missed opportunity. there was not much time to ponder about such 
issues though as on 10 March 1966, President de gaulle announced his 
intention to terminate the assignment of French forces to international com-
mands, requesting the removal from his territory of all foreign military units 
and facilities.6 this meant that both shaPe’s and nato’s headquarters need-
ed to be relocated. 
transfer to belGium 
typically for international diplomacy, the relocation of both the military and civil-
ian branches of nato engendered ample background manoeuvring. neverthe-
less, quite quickly, consensus grew that belgium was the best option. apart 
from the geo-strategic location of the brussels area as well as its increasing 
statute as european capital, belgium’s reliability to the alliance also played in 
its favour.7 one of its top politicians, Paul henri spaak, had been one of the 
treaty’s architects and later secretary-general (1957-61), while the then Min-
ister of foreign affairs, Pierre harmel, was a leading figure in international di-
plomacy. the vote in Parliament was far from unanimous however: with more 
than one third of the votes against the installation of shaPe and nato, the de-
bates reflected the growing animosity towards militarism in the public opinion.8
nonetheless, once approved, the relocation was put through at an impressive 
speed. although the allied commanders had lobbied for a site closer to brus-
sels, the belgian authorities decided that shaPe should be located at least 
50 km from the capital as it constituted a major wartime military target. In 
order to limit costs and speed up the project, a 200-hectare army summer 
training camp near Mons was proposed instead. thus, it was hoped, could 
the installation of shaPe contribute to the region’s economic redress after 
the closing of the coalmines. In less than nine months, the entire site was 
transformed into a fully operational military headquarters, including a hospi-
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tal, a shopping centre, two chapels, an array of sports and leisure facilities 
and a school for 2000 pupils. this feat received great acclaim in the interna-
tional press, quoting general lemnitzer who called the operation ‘a miracle 
of achievement’. 9
then, the more delicate issue of housing the civilian headquarters came to 
the fore. just like the French authorities fifteen years before, the belgian 
state proposed a provisory solution in attendance of a more prestigious build-
ing. one option consisted in renting the recently completed Madou tower at 
the Porte de namur. however, just like in Paris, where the local municipality 
had imposed strict rules on the architects, the issue became a matter of 
borough politics as the Ixelles city council feared for a similar scenario as 
in the leopold area, where the european administration was squeezing out 
al residential and commercial activity – all the more since nato insisted on 
becoming the sole tenant of the building. alternative locations in less densely 
populated areas were therefore examined, which led to the idea of erecting 
a new headquarters on the 1958 World Fair grounds – quite ironically, right 
on the site of the former French pavilion. In attendance, a make-do structure 
would be erected on the former military airfield of evere, along the road linking 
the national airport with the centre of brussels. 
the design of the provisional facility was entrusted to a temporary association 
of two respected firms namely groupe structures (architecture and planning) 
and traction et electricité (infrastructure and engineering).10 developed in 
only a couple of weeks, the plans of the temporary facility read as a diagram 
of the alliance’s principal components and processes.11 (Figure 1) the heart 
of the complex was formed by the ‘situation centre’, a communication room 
linking the facility with all other nato stations around the globe (building M), 
the array of 14 conference rooms (building l) and the secretary general’s 
office (on the first floor of building o). together they commanded a sort of sup-
ply chain staffed with 2000 office workers, each processing, discussing or 
filing bits of information in one of the 1320 offices of the 15 national delega-
tions (buildings a – e), the Military committee (formerly in Washington, build-
ings F-h) or the International secretariat’s supporting services (buildings I, j). 
these highly secured (accessible only for nato staff) areas were connected 
by an east-West circulation axis, linking the secured zone with the ‘public’ 
zone (i.e. accessible for accredited visitors) comprising a large restaurant, a 
bank and postal office, a travel agency, a library as well as the press centre 
and broadcasting studios. this entire little city was sealed of from the outer 
world by means of a fence and accessible only though the security gate on 
the boulevard leopold III. 
not only the design, but also the construction process was organized in an 
almost industrial fashion. totalling a built-up area of 30,000 mq, the facility 
was built in less than six months’ time thanks to a rigid day-by-day planning 
and heavy prefabrication. For example, the precast panels arrived at the site 
in the morning, were checked by the site architect on the truck itself, and 
installed right away, leaving no room for hesitation or mistakes.12 just like 
for all major nato projects, the rough work was done by an international 
consortium of contractors (egta-nederhorst-lucks, strabed and heinen & 
Fils) while many more firms from various countries contributed to the in-
terior finishing. as it was rightfully noted in the architecture periodical La 
Technique des Travaux, such a degree of team spirit and professionalism in 
public command was rare in belgium. 
building at such a speed comes at a cost however. by contrast with the 
Parisian headquarters, the premises at evere were of an almost martial 
austerity. to save on the foundations and rule out elevators, the facility was 
entirely spread out on ground level, while the concern for standardization 
resulted in only two types of office space (3,5m x 3,75m and 4,20m x 
4,50m), uniformly laid out around a series of interior courtyards. contrary 
to the Parisian building, where the offices giving out on the bois de boulogne 
were the most sought after, there were no privileged spaces in evere with 
the exception of the secretary-general’s office on the 2nd floor above the 
entrance, from which, the atomium could sometimes be seen. It comes 
as no surprise, then, that the move to brussels was not really looked for-
ward to by many nato staff members.13 dubbed ‘little siberia’ for reason 
of the cold and forbidding appearance of the sparsely built up area at the 
time, the belgian authorities (unconsciously?) even emphasized the isolated, 
Figure 1. schematic plan of nato premises, 1967. Source: Private collection of the 
author.
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extra-territorial character of this international island by assigning it a proper 
postal code (1110). 
transformation into standinG headquarters 
on the occasion of the inauguration of the new premises on 16 october 
1967, the correspondent for the International Herald Tribune wrote: ‘[…] 
the belgians are already putting to good use the bureaucratic proverb that 
“nothing is more permanent than the temporary”. With its prefabricated 
concrete panels, the complex is certainly solid enough for a long stay. the 
interiors are far more attractive than the outside.’14 With hindsight, these 
were prophetic words: only two years later, the nato council effectively 
buried the plans for a new building at heyzel, deciding instead to transform 
the provisory facility into a permanent headquarters.15 In the first place, the 
price tag of building anew, estimated at a stunning 2.5 billion belgian francs 
(approx. 60 million euros), was difficult to defend in a context of increasing 
pacifism in the public opinion. still a hefty expenditure, modifying and extend-
ing the existing premises for one fifth of this sum seemed a more reason-
able alternative. Further, car access to the heyzel became an issue as 
traffic coming form the airport and the residential areas West of brussels 
(where most of nato personnel had settled) needed to cross the Willebroek 
channel via an already congested bridge.16 by contrast, the remoteness of 
evere – considered a major disadvantage at first – provided for excellent 
accessibility. Moreover, many staff members had quickly become attached 
to the relative tranquillity of the site, the isolation of which allowed for water-
tight security without hampering any third parties.17 Finally, in 1970, 375 
extra offices and 2000 mq of additional conference rooms were created to 
cater for the increase in personnel, due in part to the arrival of yet another 
nato branch, namely the Military agency for standardisation.18 additional 
conference rooms were also provided, together with more extensive fa-
cilities for the press and a sports centre for the staff and their families. 
Finally, one large conference room was also upgraded and refurbished as 
a ‘prestige room’ for ministerial meetings, while wall-to-wall carpeting and 
some greenery were installed to upgrade the barren interior environment. 
In order to not disturb the routine activities and respect the organic unity of 
the ensemble, the additional office capacity was concentrated in two longi-
tudinal bars on the north side of the existing building. the resulting 200 m 
wide façade significantly augmented nato’s presence along the leopold III 
boulevard, determining its visual identity up till the present day. (Figure 2)
 
architecture and nato rhetoric
as the nato historian Ian Q.r. thomas has observed, in the context of 
the cold War, words and metaphors were crucial weapons. as he states, 
throughout nato’s existence, rhetoric has always formed a substantial fac-
tor in its cohesion, as a mechanism or instrument of unity.19 We may there-
fore wonder if, at all, architecture (in its capacity of communicating ideas 
and meanings through built form) had a role to play in the nato discourse. 
the inauguration address by the then nato secretary-general Mario brosio 
on 16 october 1967 is revealing in this regard. brosio stated:
after the casteau miracle, we are now faced with a new wonder 
achieved within an extraordinarily short time by the firms of your own 
and other friendly countries. […] I like to see this spirit of co-operation 
and mutual understanding as a token and pledge of the feeling we can 
expect to see develop between nato and your country […] nato’s 
new location gives further cause for optimism. the transfer of nato is 
no mere removal operation; it will also be the source of improvements 
in the future working of our organization. 20 
as we have seen, nato’s successful transfer to belgium, involving the 
transportation of 300 tons of documents and approximately 15,000 people 
(staff, families and relatives included) without interrupting the activities of 
Figure 2. nato premises after alterations in the early 1970s. Source: nato archives 
(used with permission).
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the organization, remains a feat that is unequalled in the history of inter-
national organizations and that has provided us with textbook examples of 
rationalist design, standardization and prefabrication. yet, in brosio’s mind, 
progress was not only to be expected from technology and innovation, but 
first and foremost from cooperation between people across disciplines, 
ranks and nationalities. this emphasis on the new headquarters as a prod-
uct of the alliance’s core values of unity, solidarity and cooperation must 
be understood in the light of the slumbering crisis within the organization. 
on the one hand, its future was uncertain as the atlantic treaty expired in 
1969, leaving each partner free to withdraw without further consequences. 
on the other hand, nato faced wide-spread scepticism as it was felt that 
it had fulfilled its original purpose and had become somewhat obsolete. 
Moving into the new premises at brussels thus went hand in hand with a 
process of self-reflection and reorientation. Indeed, as one journalist noted, 
after all the splendours of Paris, nato’s taking up residence in a precast 
concrete structure located in a developing industrial area outside town, was 
symbolic of the retour aux sources the organization was going through.21 
this transitory ritual was completed during the very first meeting of the 
council in brussels in december 1967, with the unanimous adoption of bel-
gian Foreign Minister harmel’s Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.22 
While it stressed the continuing importance of the atlantic partnership’s 
twin identity, it pleaded for a more political role of nato as a complement 
to its predominantly military means of action. this might explain why in a re-
port on the new facility in the NATO Letter (the organization’s official monthly 
magazine), emphasis was put on its non-hierarchical and ‘democratic’ lay-
out as a symbol of equality and harmonious collaboration, while the so-called 
‘Main street’ – the central hallway bisecting the entire building from east 
to West, connecting its various parts – was presented as a crucial feature 
in facilitating encounter and consultation between military and civilian staff 
members.23 
thus, in nato’s rhetoric, the new building not only constituted a metaphor 
for the alliance’s strength to overcome logistical and technical challenges, 
it also became considered as an instrument in preparing its future modus 
operandi. seen from this perspective, economical and pragmatic reasons 
left aside, the decision to upgrade the provisory premises at evere to a 
standing headquarters may thus as well have had to do with a certain at-
tachment to the temporary facility and an understanding that it not only 
embodied but possibly also fostered values of crucial importance in facing 
the challenges of the cold War.
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